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A B S T R A C T
The expansion of nature-based tourism on private land requires new mechanisms to coordinate tourism industry
and commercial forestry interests. This attribute-based contingent valuation study elaborated the supply side of
potential payments for ecosystem services (PES) mechanism named Landscape and Recreational Values Trading
(LRVT), proposed to enhance the provision of amenity values in privately owned forests located in tourism and
recreation areas. Using a mail survey data set, we analyzed forest owners’ willingness to participate in LRVT and
the related compensation claims in the Ruka-Kuusamo area, Finland. We found that more restrictive rules re-
garding forest management practices decrease the probability of participating and increase forest owners’
compensation claims in LRVT. Furthermore, forest owners seem to claim more compensation if, instead of
private negotiations, competitive tendering is used to make contracts. Moreover, besides the protection of
landscape values, biodiversity protection may be a motive for participation. This indicates that, in addition to
improved landscape quality, respondents gain personal benefits from enhanced biodiversity in their own forests.
The results can help in designing and implementing a future payment mechanism for the provision of forest
landscape and recreational values in terms of how to proceed and whom marketing and recruiting efforts should
target.
Introduction
Nature-based tourism in forested regions
Nature-based tourism (NBT) is an important and growing economic
sector in Central and Northern Europe and has high potential in the
forest-rich countries in Eastern Europe. In Finland, Norway and
Sweden, the growth potential for new tourism business is included in
the current bioeconomy strategies (Finnish Bioeconomy Strategy, 2014;
Sustainable Innovatio, 2013; Swedish Research and Innovation
Strategy, 2012), and the growth relies strongly on an increased number
of foreign visitors, including those from outside Europe (e.g., Roadmap
for Tourism, 2015; Tyrväinen et al., 2017b). NBT companies typically
operate in rural regions. They are often small, and they cooperate with
other companies, resource users and resource owners — namely,
landowners. NBT entrepreneurs, however, face different socio-political
contexts, protection regimes and ownership statuses in different regions
and countries (Bell et al., 2008; Fredman and Tyrväinen, 2010). Some
entrepreneurs have established their service mainly in publicly owned
protected areas, but, in some areas and regions across Europe, the
businesses are based largely on the utilization of privately owned for-
ests.
NBT builds on attractive nature, nature experiences and activities
and is highly dependent on the quality of the natural environment
(Margaryan, 2016; Tyrväinen et al., 2008). Particularly in the Nordic
countries, free access to all nature areas, independent of the land
ownership, i.e., the Right of Public Access, is an important asset
(Kaltenborn et al., 2001; Sandell and Fredman, 2010). As a result,
managed forests act as an important resource for outdoor recreation. In
regions with intensive wood (biomass) production, short rotation cycles
— for example, less than 60–70 years — and large management units,
are often common practices in forest management. These may nega-
tively affect the amenities of the forest landscape and thus decrease the
environmental quality of forests for tourism.
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The forest preference studies conducted in Northern Europe and in
the United States have concluded that people appreciate mature forests
with good visibility, some undergrowth and a green field layer with no
strong visible signs of forest management (e.g., Gundersen and Frivold,
2008; Ribe, 2009). In contrast, large regeneration cutting areas and
direct traces of cutting, such as signs of soil preparation and logging
residue, reduce the recreational quality of forests. It is, however, ob-
vious that demand for modified forest management from tourism differs
between different recreation activities and tourism seasons. A downhill
skier on a mountainside may enjoy scenery located farther away than a
hiker within a forest (Silvennoinen, 2017). During the summer, the
traces of cutting often are more disturbing than in winter, when snow
covers the ground (Tyrväinen et al., 2017a). Consequently, areas with
growing tourism and recreational use are facing demands to modify
forest management to maintain and enhance the landscape, recrea-
tional and biodiversity values. Adapted landscape management
methods are called for in active recreational or tourism areas, in par-
ticular along trails and paths and near other tourism services and
structures.
In Finland, as in some other countries, legislation poses specific
requirements for the management of state-owned commercial forests to
provide social and environmental services, along with timber (Act on
Metsähallitus, 2016). Consequently, for example, in forest cuttings,
buffer zones are left along lakes, rivers, and hiking trails to preserve
wooded scenery. In practice, different uses and management goals,
including the needs of tourism entrepreneurs, are negotiated within a
participatory planning process. In contrast, private lands management
decisions are made by individual landowners, while current forest
legislation is mainly designed to safeguard renewal of forest stands and
protect valuable sites for biodiversity; not to maintain landscape and
recreation values (Act on changes in Forest Act, 2013). Therefore, new
mechanisms in private forests are needed to enhance production of
landscape and recreation values and also help in integrating tourism
and commercial forestry needs and interests.
The social and economic forest benefits from amenity values can be
significant, although they are not always reflected in the market prices.
In fact, visitors are shown to be willing to pay for an enhanced supply of
forest amenities in tourism areas, in particular for enhanced landscape
and biodiversity values (Tyrväinen et al., 2014). According to a choice
experiment study by Mäntymaa et al. (2018), a conservative estimate of
an average willingness-to-pay per visitor for increasing quality of
landscape and biodiversity in the Ruka-Kuusamo area would be 7 euros
per visitor per week (i.e., 1 €/visitor/day). Assuming an estimated
annual number of 500,000 registered overnight stays in the area, such a
payment could eventually result in an annual revenue of half a million
euros.
In privately owned forests, however, economic incentives for land-
owners to support the production of amenity values for public use are
lacking. Therefore, the provision of these values is not adequately taken
into account in forest management. Moreover, most subsidies for pri-
vate-forest owners (for example, in Finland), target the enhancement of
timber production (Hänninen et al., 2017). Therefore, new funding
instruments that support the provision of amenity benefits on private
land as well as compensation mechanisms that bring income to land-
owners have attracted attention in recent studies (e.g., Mäntymaa et al.,
2018; Thorsen et al., 2014).
New ways to integrate nature-based tourism and commercial forestry
In Finland, a new idea for a PES system has been proposed, called
Landscape and Recreation Value Trade (LRVT), in which forest owners
would be compensated for voluntarily enhancing the provision of
landscape and recreational values in their own forests (Tikkanen et al.,
2017; Tyrväinen et al., 2014). It has been suggested that the funds for
the mechanism can be collected from the visitors and tourism en-
trepreneurs using the area. The funding may, however, also be gathered
from a combination of actors and sources from both the public and the
private sector in a way that locally works the best (e.g., Payments for
Ecosystem Services, 2013). To evaluate the prerequisites of the future
system, it is important to assess the acceptability of the mechanism and
the compensation claims among forest owners.
In Europe, public forest owners are often more inclined to consider
the provision of long-term production values and public goods, while
private owners are more oriented towards short-term benefits and pri-
vate goods (e.g., Gorriz et al., 2014). However, private-forest ownership
studies show diverse motivations, attitudes and goals linked to their
ownership (Boon et al., 2004; Kuuluvainen et al., 1996; Majumdar
et al., 2008). In a study by Leppänen (2010) on Finnish forest owners’
objectives, owners were grouped into multi-objective owners, recrea-
tionists, self-employed owners, investors and indifferent owners. The
mix of goals has increased due to urbanization and a decrease in
owners’ dependence on forest-based incomes. The diversification of
goals may also be linked to general value changes in society
(Dominguez and Shannon, 2011; Karppinen and Korhonen, 2013). In
principle, the more the owners’ objectives are in line with producing
multiple benefits or amenity benefits, the more likely it is that they will
be willing to adopt the use of voluntary instruments that enhance the
provision of ecosystem services (Gorriz et al., 2014; Mäntymaa et al.,
2009).
In Finland, a country with 5.4 million inhabitants, 737,000 forest
owners manage some 347,000 forest holdings exceeding 2 ha of for-
estland (Finnish statistical yearbook of forestry, 2014). Finnish studies
have recognized the increased share of multi-objective or amenity
value-oriented forest owners during the past decades (e.g., Hänninen
et al., 2011; Valkeapää and Karppinen, 2013). A recent study by
Häyrinen et al. (2017) dealing with the future use of forests and the
perceptions of non-industrial private-forest owners in Finland found
that forest owners were emphasizing future value creation based on
forest ecosystem services. This would mean that the use of forests would
be diversified in the future beyond the dominant raw material-driven
mindset. Thus, new possibilities may emerge for the provision of forest-
based recreational services, cooperation with NBT and increasing value-
added wood products.
So far, a lot of research on environmental benefits in a PES frame-
work has been conducted regarding agricultural environments
(Christensen et al., 2011; Lienhoopa and Brouwer, 2015 Villanueva
et al., 2015, 2017). In addition, water-related issues have received ex-
tensive interest (see Martin-Ortega et al., 2013). Research on private-
forest owners’ willingness to engage in producing amenity benefits with
PES schemes has focused largely on biodiversity conservation (e.g.,
Horne, 2006; Lindhjem and Mitani, 2012; Mäntymaa et al., 2009; Vedel
et al., 2015a, b). There is considerably less research on how to enhance
landscape and recreational values (Ovaskainen et al., 2014). As far as
we know, some important topics, such as the use of competitive ten-
dering or private negotiations in the organizing of PES, or forest
owners’ possible reactions to different levels of restrictions in forestry
practices, have not been analyzed. Thus, there are several open ques-
tions related to participation and the compensation that forest owners
would claim for making voluntary agreements to provide landscape and
recreational values. There is a clear need to analyze the details of the
feasibility of LRVT, as they may be crucial for the acceptance of and the
willingness to participate in the mechanism, as well as the compensa-
tion, claimed by forest owners. In addition, this study sheds light on a
methodological aspect. Except for the study by Moore et al. (2011),
there are not very many studies in valuation literature that apply at-
tribute-based contingent valuation method (AB-CVM). This study gives
new information about the pros and cons of the use of AB-CVM.
The aim of the study is to discover private-forest owners’ willingness
to engage in voluntary contracts and compensation agreements to en-
hance the amenity benefits of forests in the Ruka-Kuusamo tourism area
in northeastern Finland. Using a data set from a mail survey, we ana-
lyzed the acceptability of a new local PES system (LRVT) among forest
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owners. The key research questions were: i) what is the participation
rate and what are the determinants explaining the participation of
forest owners in LRVT; ii) what is the average level of compensation
payments claimed by forest owners and what are the determinants
explaining the compensation claims; and iii) how do the compensation
claims differ between segments of forest owners? In particular, we as-
sess how the potential ways of implementing LRVT affect owners’
willingness to participate and their stated compensation claims (i.e.,
willingness to accept, WTA). The assessment of the potential ways to
implement include two attributes: first, the scope of limitations set for
forest management (clear cutting versus all cutting prohibited in forests
with an important landscape for nature tourism) and second, the
method of making contracts (competitive tendering versus private ne-
gotiations). The comparison of the two methods of making contracts is
an important methodological aspect of the study related to organizing a
PES mechanism. The information on the average compensation claims
is not sufficient to assess the feasibility of a new policy mechanism such
as LRVT. The average stated WTA may be high, but some forest owners
might be willing to participate in LRVT at a lower compensation level.
Hence, it is important to consider in greater depth how the compen-
sation claims differ between forest owners by identifying segments of
respondents who are willing to participate with low compensation
payments. From the policy point of view, this information helps the
organizer(s) of LRVT to identify and communicate better with the po-
tential participants in the PES system. In the case of a new system that
does not yet exist, this kind of hypothetical setting is the only feasible
option to study the questions.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the theo-
retical framework of the study, which is followed by the presentation of
the case study area, survey questionnaire, data collection and sample
representativeness as well as the econometric models and variables.
Subsequently, the results related to forest owners’ participation and
compensation claims in possible LRVT is given, followed by an analysis
of heterogeneity in compensation claims. Finally, the results are dis-
cussed and conclusions reached particularly from the perspective of
their policy implications.
Theoretical framework
The empirical analysis utilized in this paper relies on a theoretical
model, which covers the key factors affecting forest owners’ decisions to
participate in LRVT. A similar model has been applied previously in the
context of biodiversity conservation (Langpap and Wu, 2004; Lynch
and Lovell, 2003; Mäntymaa et al., 2009; Mitani and Lindhjem, 2015;
Nielsen et al., 2018). In the model, forest owners have two options.
First, they can choose not to participate in the incentive program and
manage their forest optimally according to their forest management
objectives. Second, they may choose to participate in LRVT and manage
their forest as agreed in the contract during the contract period. After
the contract expires, they can manage their forests again according to
their objectives. The model is based on the assumption that forest
owners’ behavior is consistent with a well-defined utility function.
Accordingly, forest owners will choose to participate in LRVT if the
utility from participating (V1) is higher than the utility from not par-
ticipating (V0), that is, V1 ≥ V0.
The forest owner’s utility is determined by several factors under the
two options (see, e.g., Langpap and Wu, 2004 for a formal presenta-
tion). One important factor is the net harvest revenues. A forest stand
yields net harvest revenues over an infinite period, and the forest owner
derives utility from the net harvest revenues by managing and har-
vesting his or her forest stand. The contract reduces net harvest rev-
enues by imposing restrictions on harvesting. Along with net harvest
revenues, the utility consists of potential non-timber income. In addi-
tion, many forest owners value amenity services from their forests, in
which case the utility depends on non-consumptive values, such as
landscape scenery and biodiversity. Forest owners have heterogeneous
preferences; therefore, the demographic characteristics of the forest
owner, such as gender and age, as well as their attitudes, are also im-
portant factors (see, e.g., Boxall and Adamowicz, 2002; Hynes et al.,
2008). Finally, the utility depends on the payment received from par-
ticipating in the program. If the payment is omitted from the utility
derived from the participation (V1), the forest owner’s compensation
claim is defined as C≥V0 − V1 (Mäntymaa et al., 2009). Hence, the
factors that determine the participation decision also determine the
forest owner’s compensation claim. It is expected, however, that the
factors related to the decision and the claim are not exactly the same.
For example, it is likely that net harvest revenues have a stronger im-
pact on the compensation claim than on the decision to participate,
simply because harvest revenues and compensation payments are both
monetary concepts. Similarly, non-monetary amenity services may
have a stronger impact on the participation decision than on the com-
pensation claim. In general, the decision to participate is mostly prin-
cipled, while the compensation claim is more tangible.
Case study area, materials and methods
Case study: the Ruka-Kuusamo tourism area
Kuusamo, a town and municipality with the acreage of 5809 square
kilometers, is located in northeastern Finland in an area rich in hills and
fells. The population density is low (3.2 inhabitants per square km),
with 70% living in the town center and the rest living in sparsely po-
pulated rural areas. About two-thirds of employed people work in ser-
vices such as tourism, one-sixth work in processing industries, and
about 10% work in agriculture, forestry and reindeer husbandry. As
much as 84% of the municipality’s total land area is forested, and 82%
of the forest has non-industrial private ownership (National Forest
Inventory 9, 2016).
Tourism plays a significant role in the region’s economy. One of the
largest ski resorts in Finland, Ruka, is situated in Kuusamo. Annually,
around 1 million tourists visit Kuusamo, leaving behind a total revenue
of over 90 million euros and providing full-time employment to over
800 people. The annual number of registered overnight stays in hotels
with over 20 beds (excluding stays in one’s own or rental cottages) is
490,000. About 23% of visitors who stay overnight are international
tourists. The key tourism activities include downhill and cross-country
skiing, snowshoeing, snowmobiling and husky safaris, as well as hiking,
cycling, canoeing and the observation of birds and other boreal species.
The current accommodation capacity is 12,000 beds, including hotel
rooms and holiday homes, and 6900 holiday apartments and cottages
(Facts about Ruka and Kuusamo, 2017). The area’s strategic goals for
developing the tourism sector include increased all-year-round tourism,
increased international tourism and an increased occupancy rate of
accommodation sites.
Questionnaire, data collection and sample representativeness
The survey was targeted to private-forest owners in the Ruka-
Kuusamo area. The questionnaire of the survey included four sections.
The first section asked for background information on the respondents’
forest property and management operations over the past few years.
The second section described LRVT in detail, including the main ob-
jective of preserving the beauty of landscape and preventing the dis-
advantages of regeneration felling by delaying cutting for 5 years. No
other restrictions, e.g., hunting rights, were introduced. The structure of
preserved forests would stay as they currently are or may very slowly
change in the long run if the owners prolong the 5 years agreements
several times. In addition, the section sought the respondents’ views on
the conditions of the proposed system. The third section aimed to de-
termine the respondents’ willingness to participate and the
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compensation that they would claim for making a contract in LRVT.
The fourth section requested a few background details on the re-
spondents.1 Although we presented the facts as neutrally as possible, we
acknowledge that this ordering in the questionnaire could create a
mental bias and affect respondents’ answers. However, this ordering
stimulates a more focused mental mode and prepares the respondents
for providing more valid replies.
In the third section, four alternative LRVT models were presented to
each of the respondents. The alternatives comprised four different
combinations of two important attributes related to the implementation
of LRVT. More precisely, the attributes are the potential limitations of
forest management practices (clear cutting versus the prohibition of all
cutting in forests that are considered to be important for nature tourism
and the landscape) and the method of making contracts (competitive
tendering versus private negotiations). In the survey, each respondent
was asked to give a compensation claim related to these four choice sets
representing different combinations of attributes resulting in a panel-
type data set. The valuation technique used was an application of the
attribute-based contingent valuation method (AB-CVM)2 (Moore et al.,
2011). The stated claims can be seen as WTA measures for producing a
public good, in this case landscape and recreational benefits, under the
considered PES initiative.
A payment-card method was used for the value elicitation. The re-
spondents were shown a list of ascending euro amounts and asked to
indicate the lowest amount of their compensation claim. For the sake of
comparison, the bid vector was the same as in the study by Ovaskainen
et al. (2014), which utilized a choice experiment. The bid vector was
€30, €60, €120, €180, €240 or €300 per annum per hectare; that is, the
stated WTAs were reported in 6 interval categories. The respondents
were told that the contract period is 5 years3 and the payment is re-
ceived annually. In defining the bid vector, the highest bid was de-
termined as the level that at least covers the opportunity cost caused by
joining LRVT and resulting from the lost timber revenues in typical
mature forest stands in the vegetation zone where Ruka-Kuusamo is
located. However, to ensure that the range of bids shown on the card
would not truncate the distribution of the WTAs, there was also an
option “larger than €300,” in which the respondents were able to give
an exact monetary value (a point value) in case their WTA exceeded the
bid vector. In addition, the choice sets included the options “I would not
be willing to participate” and “I would make a contract without any
compensation.” The latter equals a zero value (€0) response.
Two versions of the questionnaire were developed. In contrast to the
basic version, the framing in the other version was altered to emphasize
that the harvest restrictions for enhancing the landscape quality would
also increase the biodiversity in a forest stand included in LRVT. One
half of the respondents were asked to answer the basic version of the
questionnaire without such an emphasis and the remaining respondents
were given the modified version with the emphasis.
Using the register of the members of the Forest Management
Association, Kuusamo (the local forest owners’ association), the sample
of the survey, consisting of 1335 persons, was selected from the po-
pulation of approximately 3050 private citizens owning forests in
Kuusamo municipality. More precisely, the sample was formed so that
all the forest owners (1151) in the Ruka-Kuusamo hotspot area, that is,
the area around the Ruka tourism resort and the Kuusamo town center
as well as the area between them, were included in the sample. An
additional randomly selected group of forest owners (184) who own
forests across the rest of Kuusamo municipality and located near the
NBT companies operating in the area was included in the sample.4 Note
that, although they own forests in this specific area, these persons may
live anywhere in the country. The survey was conducted as a postal
survey between December 2016 and February 2017 and produced 476
responses, achieving a response rate of 35.7%.
We assessed the representativeness of our results to findings of a
national Finnish forest owner survey conducted by Hänninen et al.
(2011). We compared some socio-economic characteristics between the
respondents of the Ruka-Kuusamo survey and the forest ownership
structure of the forestry center region Northern Ostrobothnia, to which
Kuusamo belongs (Table 1). The respondents of the Ruka-Kuusamo data
are more often male and more often older than those in the national
study. Notably, however, the results by Hänninen et al. (2011) describe
the situation in 2009, and since that year the average age of Finnish
people, including forest owners, has increased steadily. The fact that the
acreage of forest property is larger in the Ruka-Kuusamo study than in
the Northern Ostrobothnia region, specifically 73.4 vs. 39 ha, seems to
show that the present study more often reached those who own larger-
than-average areas of forests. As a conclusion, the results of this article
do not necessarily represent typical Northern Ostrobothnian forest
owners’ views. Instead, the survey probably received answers from
those owners who are more interested than average in the relationship
between forestry and tourism in the region.
Econometric models
In our quantitative analysis of forest owners’ willingness to parti-
cipate in LRVT and the potential compensation claimed from the
system, we used a Heckman-type sample selection model (HM) in-
cluding a two-step estimation procedure as follows: The first step of HM
involves a binomial random-effects probit model of forest owners’
participation in LRVT. The second step involves a model for explaining
the stated WTAs relating to an agreement for the protection, and in-
creasing the quality, of the forest landscape within LRVT. In the fol-
lowing, these two models are named the forest owner participation
model and the compensation claim model. Only those respondents who
were willing to participate in LRVT revealed their WTA in the survey;
therefore, a sample selection model is appropriate for the analysis. In
the Heckman two-step estimation method, a bias correction term is
estimated in the first step and used as an additional independent vari-
able in the second step (Heckman, 1979). A similar modeling approach
has been used previously in the context of biodiversity conservation
(Mäntymaa et al., 2009). In contrast to the previous study, we utilized
an interval model suitable for analyzing observations obtained by a
payment card (interval) method in the second step.5 In the model
1 A group consisting of 10 forest owners and forestry experts was asked to
comment and refine the survey instrument. Overall, the respondents were
comfortable with the survey and did not perceive any bias in the material.
However, minor formatting changes were made as a result of the comments.
2 In addition to AB-CV, we also tested the use of choice experiments (CE) in
this context. We found that the test respondents had difficulties responding to
the CE choice sets we presented. The reason for this may be that answering a CE
survey is cognitively more demanding than that of an AB-CV survey. In this
case, this fact may be more serious than usual, as the average age of forest
owners both in Finland and in the case study area is high, at about 62 years.
This fact might have lowered response activity and reduced the data set. On the
other hand, despite using AB-CV, we included in the questionnaire the two most
important attributes of our case study, i.e., potential limitations of forest
management practices and the method of making the contract. In addition, for
bringing costs to respondents’ thinking process, the former attribute reduces the
danger of the scope effect of the valuation.
3 The length of a contract period in voluntary forest biodiversity conservation
was tested by Horne (2006). It was found that short contract periods were
preferred to longer ones. The advanced age of forest owners may be a reason
why many respondents did not want to tie the hands of their heirs with a long-
standing contract. In our study, the choice of a 5 years period was a part of our
strategy to attract more respondents to reveal their preferences related to
contracts.
4 The same sample was used in an earlier study conducted in the same region
in 2012 (Ovaskainen et al., 2014).
5 Yuan et al. (2015) used the two-step procedure, linking a probit model and
an RPL model in valuing farmland conservation easements.
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estimations, the SAS LIFEREG procedure (SAS Institute Inc., 2015) was
used, in which the WTAs from the payment card were treated as in-
terval censored. In addition, the exact WTAs that exceeded the bid
vector of the payment card (> €300) as well as zero values (€0) were
treated as uncensored observations.6
In addition to HM, we utilized latent class models (LCMs) to further
investigate forest owners’ heterogeneous preferences for compensation
claims in LRVT. Regarding the feasibility and cost efficient im-
plementation of a new PES such as LRVT, it is important to identify the
forest owners with low compensation claims and the factors that
characterize them. These respondents are most likely to be willing to
make a contract with affordable compensation in LRVT. Therefore, we
investigated forest owners’ heterogeneous preferences for LRVT using
LCMs to analyze the data set. As LCMs allow the identification of dis-
tinct segments of preferences, with their relative sizes, the approach is
particularly relevant from the policy perspective. In this sense, we were
interested in how the stated WTAs differ between respondents.
LCMs are widely applied in analyzing choice experiment data (see,
e.g., Boxall and Adamowicz, 2002 for a seminal study and Juutinen
et al., 2017 for a recent application). In contrast, we applied LCMs in
the context of contingent valuation. The LCMs were estimated using the
LIMDEP GROUPED DATA procedure with panel data specification
(Greene, 2012).
Variables
In the model estimations, we employed the variables shown in
Table 2. The binary dependent variable in the forest owner participa-
tion model (the first step of HM), PARTICIP, describes the forest
owner’s decision on whether or not to participate in LRVT with any
compensation. The dependent variable WTA1, i.e., monetary amount of
compensation claimed by forest owners within LRVT for 5 years, was
used in the second step (the compensation claim model). It describes
the stated WTAs obtained by the survey, including both exact responses
and categorical responses. The dependent variable WTA2, used in the
LCM analysis, includes only categorical data. For that purpose, the
original exact WTA responses were categorized using two alternatives.
First, the responses larger than €300 and smaller than or equal to €1000
were assigned to the second-to-last category and the responses larger
than €1000 were assigned to the last category. In the second alter-
native, the responses larger than €300 were dropped from the data,
which allowed us to elaborate the impact of large WTAs on the results.7
The potential explanatory variables for the models used in the
analysis were selected following the theoretical framework presented in
the previous section. However, as many potential variables represent
different indicators of the theoretically justified factors, we included
only the statistically significant variables in the final models.
The theoretical model suggests that harvest revenues (i.e., oppor-
tunity costs of contracting) should be taken into account when ex-
amining landowners’ decisions to participate in LRVT and their com-
pensation claims. Information on stand characteristics is needed to
assess the future net harvest revenues of a forest stand (see, e.g.,
Juutinen et al., 2013; Mäntymaa et al., 2009). As we did not consider a
specific stand, it was not possible to estimate the net harvest revenues.
However, the future net harvest revenues depend on the features of a
contract; that is, the harvest restrictions that are agreed between the
forest owner and the program authority to maintain and enhance the
landscape values. For that purpose we used the variable RESTRICT,
which takes the value 1 if all cutting is prohibited and 0 if only clear
cutting is prohibited. Hence, the expected sign of RESTRICT is negative,
because the tighter the harvest restriction, the larger the lost harvest
revenues (Lindhjem and Mitani, 2012). We also included a binary
variable CCUT, which takes the value 1 if a respondent has used clear
cutting as the main method of final felling in his or her forests and 0
otherwise. The expected sign of CCUT is negative, because a forest
owner may have a negative attitude towards a contract that prohibits
the management practices that he or she has used as the main harvest
method.
The variable BIODIV was used to capture forest owners’ preferences
for biodiversity benefits and to assess whether biodiversity arguments
would be effective in marketing LRVT. BIODIV is a binary variable that
splits the sample into two sub-samples on the basis of whether
BIODIV=1 or not (BIODIV=0). The framing in the questionnaire
emphasized the fact that harvest restrictions for enhancing the land-
scape quality would also increase the biodiversity in a forest stand in-
cluded in LRVT. Respondents who received the questionnaire empha-
sizing the biodiversity benefit should be more willing to participate in
LRVT (they may also claim smaller compensation payments) than re-
spondents who received the basic version of the questionnaire if they
value biodiversity benefits. This has been shown in previous studies by
Langpap and Wu, 2004,; Juutinen et al. (2013), and Vedel et al.
(2015b), for instance. In this case biodiversity arguments in marketing
LRVT would be likely to increase the participation rate. If the effect of
framing is not significant, respondents’ preferences for biodiversity are
minor. The variable SUPPL describes the proportion of forest hectares
that a respondent is ready to supply for LRVT. Therefore, it indirectly
captures forest owners’ preferences for amenity services, such as land-
scape values. The more a forest owner appreciates the amenity services,
the larger the share that he or she may be willing to offer. This is be-
cause optimal rotation of a forest stand will be longer and opportunity
costs of contracting lower, when the contract enhances the amenity
services, i.e., the marginal valuation of amenity services increases with
Table 1
Socio-demographic characteristics of the Ruka-Kuusamo respondents and the
Northern Ostrobothnia region.
Kuusamo Northern Ostrobothniaa
Sample sizeb 367
Gender (%) Female 16.1 28
Male 83.9 72
All 100 100
Age (years,%) Below 45 6.9 13
45–54 12.1 18
55–64 26.1 31
65–74 34.1 22
75 or above 20.9 15
All 100 100
Mean 64.3 60
Area of forest property (ha) Mean 73.4 39
a Source: Hänninen et al. (2011).
b The number of observations varies between questions.
6 Our data consist of both interval and point value responses. The SAS
LIFEREG procedure is theoretically consistent with this data structure.
However, it was not possible to take into account the panel structure of the data
when applying the SAS LIGEREG procedure; that is, the responses were treated
as independent in the second step of the Heckman model. In addition, it was not
possible to estimate the joint probability of the likelihood functions of the two
models; therefore, the Heckman two-step model was utilized. Selection models
have not been developed for more complex response data and panel data for
limited dependent variables (Yuan et al., 2015).
7We tested several grouping alternatives for the exact WTAs larger than
€300, but the results were qualitatively similar. The zero WTA values were
taken into account in the LCM analysis by setting the first limit value equal to
one in the grouped data model; that is, the zero values belong to the first in-
terval, which is smaller than €1. The second limit value is 30. Hence, the bid
€30 belongs to the second interval, which is larger than or equal to €1 and
smaller than €30. We also tested another functional form for the WTA equation
by taking the natural logarithm of the limit values, but this did not improve the
performance of the model. For technical details of the grouped data model, we
refer interested readers to Greene (2012).
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stand age (Hartman, 1976; Koskela and Ollikainen, 2001; Juutinen
et al., 2013). Similarly, at a more general level, the variable RURAL
reflects amenity services, as it describes a respondent’s view of the
importance of the allocation of more money to increase the quality of
the rural landscape.
The binary variable INCOME takes the value 1 if the respondent’s
monthly income is more than €6000 and 0 otherwise. It is typical that
WTP values increase with income, but the impact of income is not clear
when the WTAs are examined. For example, the respondents with high
incomes may be more likely to participate and claim a lower compensa-
tion payment, because they are not particularly dependent on the harvest
revenues (Langpap and Wu, 2004; Uusivuori and Kuuluvainen, 2005). In
addition, Kuuluvainen et al. (2014) have shown theoretically that in the
single-stand forest rotation model, which accounts for amenity valuations,
forest owners’ increasing permanent income lengthens the rotation. For
our case, this indicates that forest owners with high incomes have higher
amenity values leading to smaller compensation claims. On the other
hand, they may claim high compensation amounts, because marginal
utility of money diminishes as income rises.
The variable GEND takes the value 1 if a respondent is male and 0
otherwise, capturing respondents’ heterogeneous preferences in the
analysis. Previous studies have shown that females typically have
stronger positive preferences for environmental concerns than males
(e.g., Xiao and McCright, 2015; Zelezny et al., 2000). However, there
are also evidence that males are participating more eagerly and re-
quiring smaller compensations than females in incentive programs
targeted to forest biodiversity conservation (Lindhjem and Mitani,
2012; Mitani and Lindhjem, 2015). The variables INTER and NOCUT
were merely used as control variables to assess the validity of the re-
sults. The larger the INTER value, the more interested a respondent is in
joining LRVT. Hence, INTER should have a positive sign in explaining
participation. The variable NOCUT receives the value 1 if a respondent
has refrained or is interested in refraining from all cutting in his or her
forest, indicating that the opportunity costs of participation in LRVT are
low. Hence, this variable should have a negative sign in explaining
compensation claims. Finally, to provide information for mechanism
design, we included the variable NEGOT to capture the method of
making contracts; that is, if contracts are made through private nego-
tiations, NEGOT takes the value 1, and, if competitive tendering is
applied, NEGOT takes the value 0.
Results
Participation and compensation claims
Both the forest owner participation and the compensation claim
model show a reasonable fit to the data, and the parameter estimates
mostly have the expected signs (Table 3). The statistically significant
coefficient of IMILLS (a bias correction term also called the inverse
Mills ratio or the hazard rate) in the compensation claim model
Table 2
Description of the variables used in the analysis.
Variable Description Mean Std dev.
Dependent variables
PARTICIP Whether a forest owner would make a contract or not; binary variable: 0 = no, 1 = yes (43%).
WTA1 Monetary amount of stated compensation claimed by forest owners within LRVT for 5 years; revelation technique: payment card; bid vector:
€30, 60, 120, 180, 240, 300/year/ha; more than €300 (= the exact value given by a respondent)/year/ha; the answer “I would not ask for any
compensation” equals €0/year/ha.
348.49a 403.26a
WTA2 Monetary amount of stated compensation claimed by forest owners within LRVT for 5 years; WTAs are coded into 1, 2,…, 9 categories; the first
category (zero WTAs) equals the interval y* < 1; the second category (€30): 1 ≤ y* < 30; the third category (€60): 30 ≤ y*< 60 and so on;
the eighth category: 300 ≤ y* < 1000; and the ninth category: y* ≥ 1000.
n.a. n.a.
Independent variables
RESTRICT Restrictions of management practices in forest stands included in the agreement of LRVT; binary variable: 0 = clear cutting prohibited, 1 = all
cutting prohibited (50%).
CCUT Respondent used clear cutting as the main method of final felling in her/his forests; binary variable: 0 = no, 1 = yes (27%).
BIODIV The framing of the questionnaire emphasizes that total cutting prohibition to enhance the landscape quality would also increase the biodiversity
in a forest stand included in LRVT; binary variable: 0 = no, 1 = yes (52%).
SUPPL Proportion of forest hectares that a respondent is ready to supply for LRVT; ratio, continuous variable. 0.20 0.31
RURAL Importance of the allocation of more money to increase the quality of the rural landscape in the respondent’s opinion; four-grade scale: 4 = high
priority … 1 = no priority.
3.30 0.75
INCOME Respondents earning more than €6000/month after taxes; binary variable: 0 = no, 1 = yes (7% or 22 obs.).
GEND Respondent’s gender; binary variable: 0 = female, 1 = male (84%).
INTER Respondent was interested in joining LRVT; five-grade Likert scale: 5 = very interested … 1 = not interested at all. 2.55 1.27
NOCUT Respondent refrained or interested in refraining from all cutting in her/his mature forests; binary variable: 0 = no, 1 = yes (35%).
NEGOT Method of making contracts; binary variable: 0 = with competitive tendering, 1 = with private negotiations (50%).
a Calculated from the class midpoints of the bid vector of the payment card.
Table 3
Parameter estimates of the forest owner participation and compensation claim
models in the Landscape and Recreation Value Trade (LRVT) mechanism.
Variable Coefficient Std error Pr > ChiSq
First step of the Heckman model: forest owner participation
CONSTANT ***–9.6974 2.1873 <0.0001
RESTRICT ***–1.3841 0.2210 <0.0001
NEGOT 0.2032 0.1785 0.2552
BIODIV **1.4002 0.6430 0.0297
CCUT *1.2190 0.6737 0.0708
INTER ***2.2864 2.1873 <0.0001
SUPPL ***3.4666 1.2762 0.0067
GEND 1.2954 0.8901 0.1460
RURAL *0.8028 0.4434 0.0706
Fit statistics
−2 log likelihood 536.54
BIC (smaller is better) 592.64
N 1042
Second step of the Heckman model: compensation claim
CONSTANT ***343.07 35.8425 <0.0001
RESTRICT *72.83 38.4113 0.0580
NEGOT *–65.35 38.0422 0.0858
NOCUT ***–142.31 41.4136 0.0006
INCOME **148.98 64.2678 0.0204
IMILLS ***384.01 78.0198 <0.0001
Scale 427.49 14.0092
Fit statistics
−2 log likelihood 4250.09
BIC (smaller is better) 4294.05
N 534
***Significant at the 0.01 level.
**Significant at the 0.05 level.
*Significant at the 0.10 level.
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indicates that the use of the sample selection approach was appropriate
for avoiding selection bias.
In the forest owner participation model, several factors were sig-
nificant in explaining forest owners’ decisions to participate in LRVT. If
the restrictions to management practices in forest stands prohibited all
cutting (RESTRICT), the tendency to participate in the mechanism de-
creased compared with a reference case in which only clear cutting was
prohibited and selective harvesting was allowed. If a forest owner has
to restrict his or her management options more, he or she will be less
eager to join. Notably, the estimate of NEGOT is not significant, in-
dicating that the method of making contracts — namely, the use of
private negotiations or competitive tendering — was not important for
the respondents when they were considering their decision to partici-
pate.
The positive sign of the BIODIV coefficient shows that emphasizing
the biodiversity improvement in the framing of the valuation question
of the survey increased the probability of participation. Additionally,
those who have used clear cutting as their main method of final felling
in their forests (CCUT) are more often willing to participate. INTER also
has a positive sign, indicating that the more interested a respondent is
in participating in LRVT when asked separately before the valuation
question, the more often she or he shows the same interest later in the
WTA section of the survey. This is, of course, a circular argument and
the obvious reflection of respondents’ positive attitudes towards land-
scape protection but advocates the validity of the forest owner parti-
cipation model.
The plus sign of SUPPL means that the larger the proportion of
forest area that a respondent is ready to supply for LRVT, the more
likely it is that she or he is willing to participate. The positive coeffi-
cient of GEND means that if a respondent is male, he is more likely to
participate. Although the estimate of GEND is not significant, we kept
the variable in the model as it captures the effect of respondents’ het-
erogeneity in the model. Finally, the higher the respondents prioritize
the rural landscape in terms of the allocation of more money to public
goods in general (RURAL), the greater the probability that they will be
willing to participate in LRVT.
In response to the follow-up question regarding the reason for not
participating in LRVT, the following arguments accounted for most of
the choices: “there are no sites of special scenic importance in my
forests” (16.5% of respondents), “landscape and recreational values will
be preserved in my forests without agreements restricting cutting”
(16.3%), “regardless of compensation, I don’t want to have any con-
straints on what to do in my forests” (12.7%) and “I don’t need a me-
chanism like LRVT to disturb my present practices of good forest
management” (12.1%).8 In the light of the comments given in the
survey, these responses partly reflect the suspicion and skepticism that
the respondents feel regarding this new mechanism.
As a starting point for the analysis of stated WTAs, we calculated
that the mean value of compensation claims by forest owners was
€328.9 per hectare per year with 95% confidence limits of
€300.3–€357.5.9 In the compensation claim model, the monetary
amount of compensation (WTA1) claimed by forest owners in LRVT is
explained by five significant variables (shown in the lower part of
Table 3). CONSTANT shows the average reference compensation pay-
ment, specifically the annual monetary amount per hectare (€343) that
owners claim for a contract; that is, not captured by the other ex-
planatory variables.10 With respect to the restrictions to management
practices in forest stands included in LRVT, the case in which all cutting
is prohibited (RESTRICT) tends to increase claims by €73/ha/year
compared with a reference case in which only clear cutting is pro-
hibited. The logic here is clear: if a forest owner has to restrict his or her
harvesting possibilities more, he or she has to be paid more. The me-
chanism design also matters. If contracts are to be made through private
negotiations (NEGOT) instead of competitive tendering, the owners
would claim €65 per hectare per year less. Hence, the respondents seem
to prefer private negotiations to competitive tendering. In addition, if a
respondent has refrained or is interested in refraining from all cutting in
his or her mature forests (NOCUT), he or she would claim €142 per
hectare per year less compensation than otherwise. Finally, respondents
who earn more than €6000 per month (INCOME) after taxes would
claim €149 more compensation annually for a 1 ha increase of forest
included in a LRVT contract than the rest of the respondents.
Heterogeneity in compensation claims
We analyzed heterogeneity in compensation claims estimating
LCMs with two slightly different data sets. The first model included all
the respondents’ compensation claims. In the second model, we ex-
cluded claims higher than €300 from the data set. The excluded re-
sponses can be considered as protest bids. Alternatively, these bids can
include some other values than lost harvest revenues caused by the
contracting; for example, landowners’ expectations of high land values
in construction use. We examined respondents’ “taste” variation for the
harvest restrictions (RESTRICT) and the mechanism design (NEGOT).
To shed further light on the differences in the stated WTAs between
classes, we used INTER as a class membership variable. Two-class
models were used in the LCM analysis.11
The WTAs differ considerably between the two classes (Table 4).
The coefficient of CONSTANT presents the average reference WTA that
is not captured by the other explanatory variables. Hence, class 1
clearly has a higher WTA (€712) than class 2 (€162) in the first model,
which includes responses larger than €300. The outcome has a similar
pattern in the second model, in which responses larger than €300 are
excluded, but the WTAs are clearly lower (i.e., €319 and €82), and the
difference in WTAs between the two classes is substantially smaller. The
class probabilities of the models show that 23.9% belong to class 1 and
76.1% to class 2 in the first model, while, in the second model, the
allocation of the observations between the classes is more equal, spe-
cifically 44.1% and 55.9%, respectively. These results indicate that
about 37% of all the respondents (476) are willing to participate in
LRVT with average compensation of €177 per hectare per year (large
claims included) and about 20% are willing to participate with com-
pensation of €99 (large claims excluded), respectively.
The coefficient of RESTRICT is strongly significant for both classes
in the second model, indicating that forest owners claim more com-
pensation for a contract that, instead of clear cutting, prohibits all
cutting in forests included in a LRVT contract. Interestingly, RESTRICT
is not significant for class 1 in the first model. Hence, this segment of
respondents, which has the highest stated WTA, did not seem to take
into account the harvest restriction when considering their compensa-
tion claims. Comparing class 1 in the two models, the estimate of
RESTRICT more than doubles from €46 to €118, demonstrating that the
8 Note that these percentages cannot be summed, since many of the re-
spondents picked several reasons for non-participation.
9 For the calculation, we used the SAS LIFEREG procedure without additional
regressors, where the coefficient of the intercept term is the estimate of the
mean value. With an alternative non-parametric technique, such as the
Turnbull estimator, we obtained €592/ha/year for the average value of com-
pensation. The reason why this estimate is larger than the one in the model
above is that, in the WTA case, Turnbull estimation provides the higher bound
mean, while, in the WTP case, it calculates the lower bound mean, giving a
conservative value (see, e.g. Blaine et al., 2005; Perman et al., 2011, 421–422).
The corresponding midpoint average is €348 with a standard deviation of 403
(Table 2).
10 Notably, the coefficient of IMILLS also explains the WTAs. The mean value
of IMILLS is 0.091 in the data set. Thus, the associated mean WTA is €34.94.
The impact of CONSTANT and IMILLS together is thus €378.01.
11We also tested LCMs with more than two classes, but they did not con-
verge. The LCMs were estimated using LINDEP 10.0 (Greene, 2012).
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coefficient of RESTRICT for class 1 is sensitive to the treatment of the
highest compensation values. At the same time, the comparable esti-
mates of class 2 remain quite stable at €48 and €41.
NEGOT is non-significant for both classes of the models but has
negative signs, hinting that forest owners might claim less compensa-
tion for a contract that uses private negotiations as the method of
making contracts in LRVT. INTER has a minus sign with a weakly sig-
nificant coefficient in the first model and a strongly significant coeffi-
cient in the second model for class 1, indicating that the less interested a
respondent is in participating in LRVT, the more probable it is that he or
she belongs to class 1. Hence, the respondents with the highest com-
pensation claims are not especially interested in participating in LRVT.
Discussion and conclusions
We examined the supply side of the LRVT mechanism that has been
proposed to enhance the provision of amenity values in privately-
owned forests used for tourism and recreation. Using a data set from a
mail survey and an attribute-based contingent valuation method, we
analyzed forest owners’ willingness to participate and willingness to
accept compensation. These are two related fundamental aspects of
supply that should be considered in developing and implementing a
new PES mechanism. To establish an efficient and feasible mechanism,
it is important to assess the potential participation rate and understand
which drivers motivate landowners to participate in LVRT and which
discourage them. Similarly, it is important to assess the level of
monetary compensation that forest owners are likely to require and
which factors determine their compensation claims. In particular, it is
important to identify those segments of forest owners that are willing to
participate with a lower compensation level for effective targeting and
marketing of LRVT.
We found that fewer than half of the respondents (43%) were
willing to participate in LRVT. In response to the follow-up question
asking for their reason not to participate, a considerable share of the
respondents chose at least one of the options given in the questionnaire,
such as not owning a site with special importance or a willingness to
preserve landscape and recreational values without agreements. In the
light of the comments made in the survey, these responses partly re-
flected the suspicion and skepticism that the respondents felt towards a
new mechanism. In the possible future design of LRVT, attention needs
to be paid to clarifying the rules of the system and the transparency of
its implementation. A communicative and deliberative information
process, for example, that includes public hearings and discussion
meetings, is needed. A typical forest owner in the studied sample and in
Finland generally is quite aged. This may be a reason for many of the
respondents being suspicious about the survey and the idea of LRVT
and unwilling to state that they would participate in the mechanism. On
the same grounds, the questions related to the monetary amounts of
LRVT compensation may have been too difficult to answer. The ad-
vanced age of the respondents may also be a reason why some re-
spondents did not want to tie the hands of their heirs by reporting their
positive interest in LRVT contracts.
However, given that LRVT is a new suggested payment mechanism,
which has not yet been put into practice in the area, the estimated
participation rate is surprisingly high. Mitani and Lindhjem (2015)
presented a similar participation rate for voluntary biodiversity con-
servation in Norway, but Markowski–Lindsay et al., (2011) found much
lower participation rates considering forest landowner participation in
carbon markets in the United States. One likely reason for the high
participation rate in our study is the short contract period (5 years)
presented to the respondents in the valuation scenario. The length of
agreement has been found to decrease participation in voluntary pay-
ment mechanisms (Horne, 2006; Markowski–Lindsay et al., 2011).
Another reason may be that Finnish forest owners are familiar with a
payment mechanism for biodiversity conservation (Juutinen et al.,
2008) and therefore are accustomed to making this type of participation
decision.
The strongest management restriction (i.e., harvesting prohibited
during the contract period) in LRVT decreased the likelihood of parti-
cipation and increased the compensation claim compared with the
weaker restriction (i.e., clear cutting prohibited, but selective har-
vesting allowed). These results were expected, as direct opportunity
costs and financial losses increase with management restrictions.
Hence, the respondents had realized the scope of the management re-
strictions, indicating the reliability of the results and supporting the
argument that attribute-based methods are less vulnerable to a scope
effect than the (non-attribute) contingent valuation method (Smith and
Osborne, 1996). The results confirm the previous findings obtained by
Ovaskainen et al. (2014), who investigated LRVT by applying a choice
experiment. Similarly, Vedel et al. (2015b) found that management
restrictions have an impact on forest owners’ willingness to accept
compensation for biodiversity conservation in Denmark. In addition,
previous studies on participation in voluntary biodiversity conservation
have found that a high harvest value of the target stand and percentage
of productive forest increase compensation claims (Lindhjem and
Mitani, 2012; Mäntymaa et al., 2009). Also owners who perceive con-
servation regulations to be too strict are less likely to participate
(Mitani and Lindhjem, 2015).
We also found that the instrumental design of LRVT affected the
compensation claims to some extent, but not the participation decision.
In particular, forest owners claimed more compensation if competitive
tendering was used as a method of making contracts instead of private
negotiations. This is a novel finding. As far as we know, these methods
of PES implementation have not been studied in previous environ-
mental valuation literature. The competitive tendering as a new means
to negotiate contracts for compensation is an interesting aspect of this
study and an important contribution to new knowledge. The finding
supports the conclusion that a method of implementation, such as
competitive tendering, which treats forest owners anonymously
without any face-to-face discussions, may decrease the participation
Table 4
LCMs estimated with large compensation claims (> €300 included) and
without large compensation claims (> €300 excluded).
GROUP Coefficient Std error Prob.
|z|> Z
Coefficient Std error Prob.
|z|> Z
Large claims included Large claims excluded
Model parameters for latent class 1
CONSTANT ***712.313 43.943 0.0000 ***318.553 26.861 0.0000
RESTRICT 45.871 49.216 0.3513 ***117.521 34.289 0.0006
NEGOT −17.616 47.863 0.7128 −22.8992 26.021 0.3789
Sigma ***201.002 26.147 0.0000 ***125.931 17.561 0.0000
Model parameters for latent class 2
CONSTANT ***161.513 14.772 0.0000 ***81.824 14.117 0.0000
RESTRICT ***48.282 17.271 0.0052 ***41.495 15.055 0.0058
NEGOT −12.865 16.950 0.4478 −2.466 14.678 0.8666
Sigma ***201.002 13.187 0.0000 ***125.931 12.607 0.0000
Estimated prior probabilities for class membership
Intercept_1 −0.390 0.467 0.4034 **1.194 0.553 0.0310
INTER_1 *–0.244 0.148 0.1000 ***–0.456 0.161 0.0047
Intercept_2 0.0 (Fixed parameter) 0.0 (Fixed parameter)
INTER_2 0.0 (Fixed parameter) 0.0 (Fixed parameter)
Prior class probabilities at data means for LCM variables
Class 1 0.239 0.441
Class 2 0.761 0.559
Log likelihood function −1480.17 −869.82
AIC 2980.3 1759.6
AIC/N 3.811 2.250
N (unbalanced panel) 782 577
Individuals 233 172
***Significant at the 0.01 level.
**Significant at the 0.05 level.
*Significant at the 0.10 level.
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rate. In addition, it may increase the compensation claims when the
payment mechanism targets non-industrial private forest owners. There
is, however, evidence that private negotiations in contracting may re-
sult in high information rents (Juutinen et al., 2013).
Another interesting and important result is that, besides the pro-
tection of landscape values, the protection of biodiversity may be an
additional essential motive for forest owners’ participation. This is an
important finding indicating that, as well as landscape quality, re-
spondents may gain personal benefits from improving the biodiversity
in their own forests. A comparable phenomenon has already been
identified in a voluntary biodiversity protection program in Finland
(Mäntymaa et al., 2009) and in the United States (Langpap and Wu,
2004). This indicates that emphasizing the co-production of biodi-
versity might be a good marketing argument to attract forest owners to
make a contract within LRVT.
An additional noteworthy result is that, if a respondent has re-
frained or is interested in refraining from all cutting in his or her mature
forests, he or she would claim a smaller compensation amount than
otherwise. Similarly, Vedel et al. (2015b) found that Danish forest
owners’ willingness to accept contracts for ecosystem service provision
is sensitive to additionality. Our result confirms the validity of the
compensation claim model. Landowners’ compensation claims reflect
associated opportunity costs that are minor if they are refraining from
cutting in their forest in any case without a contract. Hence, if the or-
ganizer of LRVT could particularly attract such owners who are en-
vironmentally minded and owners who already have spontaneously
refrained or are interested in refraining from cutting in their own for-
ests, the compensation payments might be smaller and the system more
cost-efficient.
In addition, it is worth noticing that active forest owners who had
used clear cutting as their main method of final felling in their forests
were also more willing to participate in LRVT. One explanation for this
unexpected finding may be that the owners who are active in forest
management may also be open-minded and eager to understand the
introduction of the new instrument as a new way of earning money
(Vainio and Paloniemi, 2013). Similarly Markowski–Lindsay et al.,
(2011) concluded that forest owners who are actively planning to
manage their land may be more open to participation in carbon se-
questration programs, because the programs essentially are a type of
management activity. Thus, active forest owners may see LRVT as good
business opportunity and they may even be the early adopters of the
new system. Through LRVT, they may avoid potential obligatory con-
straints for forest management in the future. Simultaneously, they are
able to increase their forest incomes. When LRVT becomes operational,
they probably will claim higher compensations for restrictions, which
reveals a profit-seeking attitude related to forest owning. Hence, in
advertising LRVT to forest owners, they should also be targeted, for
example, by using economic arguments, such as the opportunity for
reasonable monetary compensation for providing amenity values
(Mäntymaa et al., 2009).
We also found an interesting result that the respondents willingness
to participate increases in line with the proportion of forest area that a
respondent is ready to supply for LRVT. Those who are willing to supply
a major part for the system are likely to benefit themselves from the
forest amenity services provided in their forests. In addition to land-
scape values, the protection resulting from a contract, for example, may
increase forest owner’s hunting or recreational possibilities in his or her
own forest (Amacher et al., 2003; Newman and Wear, 1993).
The average compensation claim in this study was about €330 per
hectare per year. This is quite a large value compared with the actual
average payment paid (€176/ha/year) in the Finnish conservation
program for temporal forest protection, in which harvests are not al-
lowed during the contract period (Juutinen et al., 2008). The claim also
looks rather high if it is compared to the annual operating profit in non-
industrial private forestry in North Ostrobothnia, which has varied
between 48 and 60 euros per hectare in 2013–2017 (Official Statistics
of Finland, 2018). However, based on the results from an experiment,
Nape et al. (2003) concluded that people would actually accept a
smaller payment in reality than in a hypothetical situation. Hence, the
actual payments in LRVT are likely to be somewhat lower than those
that we estimated.12 In addition, the average value may not be very
informative, as there was considerable variation in the compensation
claims. Therefore, aiming for cost-effective implementation of LRVT,
the analysis of the heterogeneity of compensation claims is interesting.
We identified two segments of forest owners and found that the re-
spondents with the highest compensation claims were less interested in
participating. Thus, the voluntary character of LRVT works simulta-
neously as a cost-reducing element, as the forest owners claiming less
compensation were more eager to join the mechanism. Our results
suggest that quite a remarkable share of forest owners was interested in
making contracts with reasonable compensation in the Ruka-Kuusamo
region. In addition, we found that forest owners claiming lower com-
pensation were less sensitive to the restrictions of forest management
practices. Thus, if the preservation of a beautiful landscape at a certain
site requires the prohibition of all cutting, it might be possible to find a
forest owner who will accept this restriction for reasonable compen-
sation.
In addition to identifying and recruiting interested forest owners,
the suitable location of the forest stands for the nature-based tourism
activities that they could offer is important for the success of LRVT. In
other words, it is more important to take care of landscape values in
stands that are located on visible sites; for example, in the vicinity of
hotels, the villages of holiday homes, skiing and hiking routes, the
slopes and tops of hills or the banks of rivers and lakes. Therefore, our
analysis may overestimate the participation rate, as some of the forest
stands considered do not have the required forest characteristics for
LRVT or they are not located in the most important places, or both.
Thus, it is also necessary to try to find and recruit hesitating persons
who own forests in the key locations of the tourism industry. This is yet
another good topic for further inquiries.
Related to the relevance of the study from the governance-making
perspective, the results help to identify some of the most important
characteristics. These characteristics are critical in developing and
implementing a future payment mechanism for the provision of forest
landscape and recreational values in terms of how to proceed and
whom efforts should target. There are, however, many other details that
should be uncovered in future research before one can be certain that a
PES mechanism such as LRVT would work in practice. The open
questions include what kind of financing and payment mechanisms
would be the most practical and cost effective, for example. A future
step could also be to make the results of the survey spatially explicit,
and link it with landscape values and forest owner specific replies or
predictions. In addition, a collaborative development process (e.g.,
Healey, 1997; Tikkanen et al., 2017) could be implemented so that the
local stakeholders would be truly able to participate in the development
of an LRVT model that would be acceptable and executable in practice.
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